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Theory and Evidence of the Impacts of Shariah Debt 




A Shariah compliant firm faces a trade-off between keeping their Shariah compliancy versus having 
their long-term debt to assets or market-capitalisation ratio above 30%, when they operate within a 
market with little or no access to a liquid Islamic debt market. On the other hand, Proposition 1 of 
Modigliani & Miller (1963) posits that interest tax shield benefits, derived from long-term debt, 
reduce the hypothetical firm’s investment cut-off rate and therefore provide extra value for the firm. 
Facing a ceiling value on their long-term debt to assets or market-capitalisation ratio, Shariah 
compliant firms therefore should be unable to fully enjoy lower interest tax shield benefits, and 
consequently, lower investment cut-off rate vis-à-vis their conventional counterparts.  Subsequently, 
any samples of Shariah compliant firms formed within a market without access to a liquid Islamic 
debt market should demonstrate a consistent tendency towards a specific set corporate financial 
behaviour due to the consistently higher than average investment cut-off rate. This paper extends 
the theoretical work of Modigliani & Miller (1963) to, firstly, demonstrate how a higher-than-average 
investment cut-off rate is a natural consequence of the debt ratio screening incorporated within the 
contemporary Shariah Stock Screening Methodology for a Shariah compliant firm that is devoid of 
access to a liquid Islamic debt market. Next, the paper outlines (with supporting empirical stylised 
facts) the subsequent corporate financial characteristics that samples of Shariah compliant firms are 
more skewed towards. The paper finds that Shariah compliant firm faces a theoretical floor limit to 
their investment-cut off rate, implying that the average Shariah compliant firm may find that lesser 
projects pass their internal rate of return vis-à-vis the projects of a similar conventional firm. 
Consequently, samples of Shariah compliant firms consistently show the following corporate financial 
characteristics; above-average size, larger marginal change in size and profitability in response to a 
given marginal change in investments, low book-to-market ratio and lower investment rates, when 

















Corporate finance behaviour and characteristics are a crucial element not least in the area of 
Fundamental Analysis as well as Asset Pricing models. Seminal papers such as Modigliani & Miller 
(1958, 1961 & 1963), hereby known as the MM abbreviation, that culminated in the Trade-Off 
Theory of Capital Structure, as well as Lambrecht and Myers (2012 & 2016) (that paves the way to 
the Inter-temporal Budget Constraint (IBC)) all attempt to illustrate and explain the corporate 
financial behaviour in one way or another.  
An important aspect relevant to both sets of papers previously mentioned are the impact of long-
term debt on the corporate financial behaviour. Where the trade-off theory suggests that the firm 
should settle on a target debt ratio that balances both the debt-related benefits versus debt-related 
costs, the IBC on the hand argues that the firm’s capital structure policy plays a cushioning role in 
absorbing exogenous earnings to accommodate a firm’s given dividend and investment policy. 
It is thus disconcerting that academic studies in the field of Shariah Compliant (SC) firms have not yet 
so far documented the theoretical impacts of the contemporary Shariah debt limitation of 
conventional long-term debt to just 33% of total assets or market capitalisation, towards the 
corporate financial behaviour of firms who do not have access to a liquid Islamic debt market. This is 
because investors who subscribe to the contemporary Shariah Stock Screening procedures may not 
be aware that their investment universe consists of firms whose debt to total assets or market 
capitalisation ratio faces a ceiling limit, which could directly lead to their corporate financial 
behaviour to skew towards certain behaviours that are not necessarily aligned with their investment 
style or appetite. 
This paper thus seeks to contribute to the current Islamic equity literature by extending the works of 
MM (1963) to the context of SC firms. Specifically, we shall extend proposition 1 of MM (1963) to 
the case where the debt-to-firm value ratio is limited only up to 0.33 and subsequently show that 
the average investment cut-off rate for SC firms will be higher compared to the conventional firm, 
given similar risk-class and corporate tax rate. In fact, the average investment cut-off rate for SC 
firms essentially has a floor limit which it, by definition, cannot go beyond. 
The paper subsequently discusses how the floor limit of SC firm’s investment cut-off rates will 
impact their corporate finance variables such as firm size, size growth rate, profitability, profitability 
growth rate, book-to-market ratio and investments. These variables are then illustrated, with 
empirical stylised facts, to consistently skew in a direction that is much more distinct compared to 
the universe of conventional stocks. Consequently, investors in the US who subscribe to the universe 
of SC firms that follow the contemporary Shariah Stock screening methodologies should be advised 
that the universe of equity assets with which they construct their portfolios with, will systematically 
skew towards the corporate financial characteristics illustrated in this paper. 
This paper shall be organised in the following manner; section 2.2 previously discussed the 
background and introduction to the topic of this paper, section 2.3 shall review the past literature 
relevant to this paper, section 2.4 discusses the data and methodology used, section 2.5 discusses 
the mathematical extensions of proposition 1 of MM (1963) as well as empirical stylised facts related 
to the mathematical findings, and finally, section 2.6 summarise the findings of this paper and the 
subsequent policy implications.  





Although the various Shariah stock screening methodologies were established in the late 1990s, 
scholarly discussion and criticism on it began relatively late. Scholarly discussions began with El 
Gamal (2006) who dedicated 10 pages of his book, Islamic Finance: Law, Economics and Practice (pg 
145-150), towards the criticism of Shariah stock methodologies.  
El-Gamal (2006)’s briefly discussed the REITs that were marketed to GCC investors at the end of 
2001. The table below demonstrates the crux of his findings. 
 
Source: El Gamal (2006) 
The table above demonstrates the total debt, total asset, the debt-to-asset ratio, and the total non-
mortgage debt-to-assets ratio of top performing international REITs that are marketed in the GCC in 
the year 2001. The table illustrates how top international REITs differ by total debt and total assets, 
however, most international REITs would fail the quantitative screenings since all of them have their 
debt to asset ratio above 33%. If conventional Shariah stock screening methodologies are applied to 
this sample of REITs, this would result in the Muslim investor, in the year 2001, to be completely 
deprived from having top performing REITs in their universe of investable assets. This could be a 
significant issue due to the fact that REITs typically offer low beta vis-à-vis the market index, and 
therefore represent a good opportunity to lower their portfolio beta. 
Next, Khatkatay & Nisar (2007) originally aim to compare and contrast the Shariah stock screening 
methodologies of the US Dow Jones Islamic Index, Malaysian SAC and Meezan Bank (of Pakistan) 
which is not relevant to our paper. However, their paper also included a short empirical analysis of 
firms in the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) 500 at the end of March 2005 that yielded interesting 




asset ratio and average cash-to-asset ratio for firms in the BSE 500 is 16.3% and 8.5% respectively. 
Through manual screening, they were able to estimate that a minimum of 384 firms and a maximum 
of 496 firms could pass all three Shariah stock screening methodology in March 2005. This means 
that 76.8-99.2% of the BSE is Shariah compliant. Therefore, if a Muslim investor decides to take the 
BSE 500 as the universe of Shariah compliant assets, he or she would find that she has access almost 
all shares in that universe, and thus, little to no biasness should exist within that universe. 
Next, Derigs & Marzban (2008) were the first paper to examine the actual constituents of Shariah 
stock screening methodologies in detail. Using a screenshot of the constituents of the S&P 500 on 
the 17th of September 20071, Derigs & Marzban (2008) performed manual Shariah stock screening 
using the methodologies of the Dow Jones Islamic Index, S&P Shariah, FTSE Shariah, MSCI, HSBC and 
Amiri Capital. These screening agencies were selected due to three reasons, firstly they were 
amongst the largest and well known screening agencies, secondly, both market capitalisation and 
total assets are represented by this group of funds, and finally, all these screening agencies share at 
least one Shariah board member with each other. 
It is interesting to note that Derigs & Marzban (2008) began their manual Shariah stock screening 
procedure by conducting qualitative screenings, which they performed using GICS codes. As we shall 
explained later in our paper, we shall utilise the Thompson Reuters Business Codes (TRBC) vis-à-vis 
the GICS. This is primarily because the GICS overall codes are now a private property of S&PDJ 
indices and therefore costs a significant amount of funds to acquire. We assume that at the time of 
writing of Derigs & Marzban (2008), GICS codes were still made public and free. 
After screening the 500 firms for non-compliant GICS codes, the paper is left with 387 firms, thus 
113 firms are found to be non-compliant due solely to their business nature. This means that only 
23% of the S&P 500 are non-compliant due to their business nature. Next, the paper applies the 
quantitative screenings according to the methodologies of the five aforementioned screening 
agencies. The resulting universe of SC firms are demonstrated in the tables below 
 
        Source: Derigs & Marzban (2008) 
The table above show that heterogenous universe of SC firms are a natural result of using a number 
of significantly different Shariah stock screening methodologies. A number of trends exists within 
the table above. Firstly, the quantity of SC firms naturally increases over time. Secondly, the paper 
notes that certain methodologies consistently produce higher number of SC firms compared to 
another. For example, the S&P Shariah stocks screening methodology always has a higher number of 
SC compare to say, HSBC. Furthermore, the table below demonstrates the percentage difference for 
each screening methodology against another. 
 





Source: Derigs & Marzban (2008) 
The table above demonstrate how the constituents of the universe of SC firms according to S&P and 
Dow Jones are consistently and significantly heterogenous compared to the SC asset universe of 
MSCI, Amiri and FTSE. Derigs & Marzban (2008) concluded that it was the denominator of the 
quantitative ratios that were the root cause of these differences, due to the fact that all five screens 
are identical, they even share the same Shariah scholars, and differ only by the definition of the 
denominator in their quantitative screenings.  
Derigs & Marzban (2008) ultimately demonstrated that the universe of SC firms differs in absolute 
size when different screening methodologies are applied. Marzban & Asutay (2012) took the analysis 
a step further by demonstrating that when different methodologies are used, the resulting universe 
of SC firm would not just differ by absolute size, but also constituents. Marzban & Asutay (2012) 
began by arguing that during the time of their writing, most prominent Shariah stock screening 
agencies were consolidating their qualitative and quantitative screenings. However, a main 
difference persists, the use of 12-month trailing market capitalisation versus total assets as the 
denominator of the financial ratios.   
Using two samples of the top 200 large-cap firms in the US and Japan, the paper firstly applies 
qualitative screenings to each sample. The resulting screened firms are then filtered into two further 
samples, the first are those that are screened through quantitative screenings that use market 
capitalisation as the denominator, whilst the second sample use total assets as the denominator. 







        Source: Marzban & Asutay (2012) 
The tables above demonstrate the some of the findings of Marzban & Asutay (2012). The first table 
show the breakdown and comparison of SC firms by industries in the US after screening using total 
assets as the denominator in the quantitative screenings (second column from the right) versus 
using 12-month trailing market capitalisation (first column from the right). The second table shows 
the same information for firms in Japan. 
As it can be observed, using total assets versus market capitalisation in the quantitative screenings 
yield different constituents within the universe of SC firms. In the US, screens that use market 
capitalisation tends to result in high numbers of technological and healthcare stocks, whilst having 
completely zero utility stocks and only one stock in telecommunication services. This observation 
alone suggest that portfolios formed for this universe of SC firms are going to be limited in access to 
utilities and telecommunication services stocks. Since these stocks tend to be income stocks, such a 
Muslim investor may be deprived of income-oriented portfolios, and may have to form portfolios 




For Japanese firms on the other hand, the contrasting constituents are stark. Firstly, market 
capitalisation screens produced only 54 SC firms out of a total of 200 firms, whereas total asset 
screens produced a more modest 88 SC firms out of 200 firms. This already entails that portfolios 
formed using market capitalisation screens in Japan would probably suffer from reduced 
diversification benefits. Furthermore, the market capitalisation universe of SC firms in Japan suffer 
greatly in the lack of stocks in the energy, financials and utilities sectors. In fact, most of its 
constituents are concentrated in the healthcare, industrials and technological sectors. This means 
that a portfolio formed in this universe, will have most of its weights in these sectors, causing sector-
dependant performance and therefore the aforementioned issue of a lack of diversification. 
 
 
        Source: Marzban & Asutay (2012) 
The tables above demonstrate the one-year yield to date and beta of portfolios formed from the 
conventional (all 200 firms), total asset-based and market capitalisation-based universe of SC firms. 
As predicted previously, the market cap-based universe in the US demonstrates a higher beta, which 
is in line with a value-oriented portfolio. On the other hand, the severely limited market 
capitalisation-based universe in Japan showed a higher beta compared to its US counterpart. This is 
again in line with our aforementioned prediction of lesser diversification benefits.  
Marzban & Asutay (2012) however, warn their readers of these findings due to the fact that their 
period of study was from the 1st of January 2010 to the 1st of January 2011, a period where the US 
and Japan were still in recovery from the Global Financial Crisis. This may explain why market 
capitalisation-based screens underperform asset-based universe screens in the US, despite higher 
beta, whilst they overperformed the asset-based universe in Japan.   
Shariq & Sukor (2017) illustrated the investment styles of different Islamic indices in the US and 
observed how different investment styles dominate in different times. For example, they were able 
to demonstrate how the screening standards of Standard & Poor’s consistently favoured large 
growth firms, at the same time, MSCI’s screening standard gradually favoured medium-sized growth 
firms.  
Next, we discuss papers that are tangent to our study, but are not directly connected. Marzban 




paper was able to demonstrate how such a screening, may result in a risk/return profile that is 
similar to the conventional all-stock portfolios.  
Finally, Marzban & Donia (2010) demonstrated empirical evidence of how two universes of SC firms 
(market cap-based vs total assets-based) in the US and GCC have significantly different constituents, 
weightings and of course, risk/return profiles. 
So far, the past literature reviewed in this section have focused on illustrating possible biasness in 
terms of constituents, risk/return profiles and investment strategies, but have yet to provide a 
theoretical framework on how the contemporary Shariah Stock Screening Methodologies may 
produce significant skewness in terms of corporate financial behaviours. 
Our paper thus seeks to contribute to the current literature in the following ways; 
1. We introduce the framework of MM (1963) within the context of Shariah Stock Screening 
methodologies (specifically the debt ratio screening) to arrive at a theoretical prediction 
regarding the SC firm’s investment cut-off rate. 
2. We then mathematically show that the floor limit to their investment cut-off rate 
systematically leads to persistent corporate financial behaviour in samples of SC firms vis-à-
vis their conventional counterparts. 
3. We also illustrate empirical stylised facts together with our mathematical predictions to 
show that empirical evidence seems to concur with our predictions. 
4. Finally, we extend the dataset used in our study where we utilised nearly 7000 firms in the 
US. Where past literature commonly used top 200 firms, or the constituents of the S&P 500 
or Shariah indices only. 
 
3. Data and Methodology Used 
 
To address our first research objective, our paper shall supplement our theoretical findings with 
stylised empirical facts of firms in the US as a demonstration of the possible skewness in the 
universe of SC firms when the debt ratio screenings are applied. Here we provide an extensive 
description of the data used in obtaining the stylised empirical facts. 
We shall utilise a sample of nearly all publicly listed stocks in the US. This sample shall consist of all 
stocks listed in the NYSE, NASDAQ and the IEX. This sample (hereby known as the All-Stocks sample 
or the AS sample) shall be the overall asset universe that the various universe of SC firms in our 
analysis will be confined in (the AS sample can be visualised as the overall rectangle in Diagram 1 in 
paper 1 section 1.2, in which the universe of SC firms, the blue circle, shall reside in). The all-stocks 
sample originally consists of 6874 firms, however, each analysis may be based on in different 
number of firms due to missing or incomplete data2. The duration of the study shall be from January 
2000 to December 2019 for a total of 240 months of monthly data. 
 
2 For example, suppose the paper perform an analysis based on the book-to-market ratio. This ratio requires 
market capitalisation of the firm, as well as it’s book equity (labelled as common equity in Datastream). Market 
capitalisation is commonly available for all listed firms in the US. However, book equity tends to be missing for 
some firms, which results in the failure to calculate the firm’s book-to-market ratio. In such case, we tend to 




We shall then perform our own Shariah stock screening procedure that closely mimics3 the S&PDJI 
Islamic Indices 2019 screening standards on the all-stocks sample. Although it may be beneficial 
from the perspective of robustness of our results to conduct the analysis using multiple standards, 
for now, we decide to follow S&PDJI’s standards due to it being one of the most well utilised 
screening procedures.  
Our Shariah stock screening procedure4 begins with qualitatively screening the all-stocks sample. 
The qualitative screen involves removing firms whose main business area are considered prohibited 
by the Shariah (such as alcohol, tobacco, conventional finance and pork-related products). We were 
able to automate this process through the usage of the Thompson Reuters Business Classification 
(TRBC) Codes. Table 1 below illustrates the list of Shariah-non compliant codes5:
 
3 Aside from Malaysia’s Securities Commission, all international screening agencies (such as S&PDJI, MSCI and 
FTSE) do not provide the list of firms who are Shariah-compliant freely, instead, this list must be purchased for 
a significant amount of funds which makes it unavailable to us.   
4 As previously mentioned, there are up to 28 Shariah stock screening agencies currently, we opt not to explain 
them all exhaustively as papers such as Adil et al (2013) have already illustrated them in detail. We instead 
prefer to give focus to our own stock screening methodology which mimics the S&PDJI’s methodology. 




Table 1 – Lists of Shariah Non-compliant TRBC Codes in the automated Shariah Qualitative Stock screening procedure. (Source: S&PDJI 2019 Islamic 
Markets) 
Business Area TRBC Code   Business Area TRBC Code 
Adult Entertainment Production & Broadcasting 5330203016  Gambling & Gaming Machine Manufacturers 5330103011 
Adult Products Retailers 5340309025  Gaming Machine Operators 5330103012 
Adult Publishing 5330204016  Health Insurance 5530103012 
Book Publishing 5330204013  Healthcare REITs 5540304011 
Brokerage Services 5510201012  Hedge Funds 5510202012 
Cable Service Providers 5330202013  Hog & Pig Farming 5410201028 
Casinos 5330103013  Horse & Dog Race Tracks 5330103014 
Casualty Insurance 5530102014  Hospitality REITs 5540304012 
Chewing Tobacco Products 5410203014  Import-Export Banks 5510105012 
Cigars & Cigarette Manufacturing 5410203013  Industrial Real Estate Development 5540201013 
Clearing, Settlement & Custodial Service 5510205012  Industrial Real Estate Services 5540202013 
Closed End Funds 5550103010  Industrial REITs 5540302013 
Collective Investment Fund Operators 5510202013  Insurance - Automobile 5530102012 
Commercial Banks 5510101011  Insurance Brokers 5530101012 
Commercial Leasing 5510105015  Insurance Funds 5550106010 
Commercial Loans 5510105011  Inter-Dealer Broker 5510201013 
Consumer Credit Cards Services 5510103012  International Trade Financing 5510105013 
Consumer Leasing 5510103013  Investment Banking 5510201011 
Copyright Management 5330203015  Investment Management 5510202011 
Craft & Micro Brewers 5410101011  Investment Trusts 5550101010 
Credit Unions 5510103014  Life & Health Reinsurance 5530105011 
Digital Publishing 5330204015  Life Insurance 5530103011 
Directory Publishing 5330204014  Lottery Operators 5330103015 
Distilleries 5410102012  Magazine Publishing 5330204012 
Diversified Investment Services 5510203010  Malt Producers 5410102013 
Diversified REITs 5540301010  Merchant Banks 5510201015 
Entertainment Production Equipment & Services 5330203014  Microfinancing 5510103015 
Factoring 5510105014  Money Center Banks 5510101013 





Table 1 – continued. 
Business Area TRBC Code   Business Area TRBC Code 
Movie, TV Production & Distribution 5330203011  Other Tobacco  5410203010 
Music, Music Video Production & Distribution 5330203012  Pension Funds 5550105010 
Office Real Estate Development 5540201011  Personal & Car Loans 5510103011 
Office Real Estate Services 5540202011  Plays & Concert Production 5330203013 
Office REITs 5540302011  Private Banks 5510101014 
Other Banks  5510101010  Private Equity 5510202016 
Other Brewers  5410101010  Property & Casualty Reinsurance 5530105012 
Other Broadcasting  5330202010  Property Insurance 5530102011 
Other Casinos & Gaming  5330103010  Pubs, Bars & Night Clubs 5330102011 
Other Commercial REITs  5540302010  Radio Broadcasting 5330202012 
Other Consumer Lending  5510103010  Residential Real Estate Development 5540201014 
Other Consumer Publishing  5330204010  Residential Real Estate Services 5540202014 
Other Corporate Financial Services  5510105010  Residential REITs 5540303010 
Other Distillers & Wineries  5410102010  Retail & Mortgage Banks 5510101012 
Other Entertainment Production  5330203010  Retail Real Estate Development 5540201012 
Other Exchange Traded Funds  5550104010  Retail Real Estate Services 5540202012 
Other Financial & Commodity Market Operators  5510205010  Retail REITs 5540302012 
Other Holding Companies  5560101010  Securities & Commodity Exchanges 5510205011 
Other Investment Banking & Brokerage Services  5510201010  Self-Storage REITs 5540304013 
Other Investment Management & Fund Operators  5510202010  Shell Companies 5560101011 
Other Life & Health Insurance  5530103010  Television Broadcasting 5330202011 
Other Multiline Insurance & Brokers  5530101010  Timber REITs 5540304014 
Other Mutual Funds  5550102010  Tobacco Farming 5410203011 
Other Property & Casualty Insurance  5530102010  Tobacco Stemming & Redrying 5410203012 
Other Real Estate Development & Operations  5540201010  Travel Insurance 5530102013 
Other Real Estate Services  5540202010  Venture Capital 5510202015 
Other Reinsurance  5530105010  Wealth Management 5510202014 
Other Restaurants & Bars  5330102010  Wineries 5410102011 




After screening out firms with prohibited TRBC codes listed previously in Table 1, we end up with a 
sample of firms that we label as the Qualitative sample (i.e it is a sample of firms who have passed 
only the Shariah qualitative screenings, but not the Shariah quantitative screenings). Next, we shall 
subject the firms within the Qualitative sample to the Shariah quantitative screenings (or also known 
as financial ratio screenings) explained in Table 2 below. 
Table 2 – Quantitative financial screenings of firms in the Qualitative sample. 
Ratios Market capitalisation (MV) as the 
denominator 
Total Assets (TA) as the 
denominator 
Debt Ratio [Total Debt/ (trailing 24-month average 
market capitalisation)]  
[Total Debt/ (Total assets)]  
Cash Ratio [(Cash & Interest-bearing securities)/ (trailing 
24-month average market capitalisation)]  
[(Cash & Interest-bearing 
securities)/ (Total Assets)]  
Receivables 
Ratio 
[Accounts Receivables/ (trailing 24-month 
average market capitalisation)]  
[Accounts Receivables/ (Total 
Assets)]  
(Source: S&PDJI 2019 Islamic Markets) 
The quantitative screenings in Table 2 above are identical to S&PDJI 2019’s Shariah Stock Screening 
methodology except for the third column of Table 2. In this column, we substituted the trailing 24-
month average market capitalisation in the denominator with total assets6 as the new denominator. 
This is done to arrive at two separate samples post-quantitative screening. The first sample will have 
their quantitative screenings done using market capitalisation as the denominator (designated as 
MV sample, standing for market-value), whilst the second sample will have their quantitative 
screenings done using total assets as the denominator (designated as TA sample, standing for total 
assets).  
Therefore, we would have a total of four samples in our study, which are, the All-stocks sample, the 
Qualitative Sample, the MV sample and finally, the TA sample. We shall label the final three samples 
as the Shariah compliant samples since these three samples have undergone some degree of Shariah 
stock screening. As mentioned before, the Qualitative sample has undergone only qualitative 
screenings, whilst the MV and TA sample have undergone both the qualitative and quantitative 
screenings. In contrast, the All-stocks sample has not undergone through any Shariah stock 
screening procedure at all. Ultimately, when we refer to the Shariah compliant (SC) samples later in 
the paper, we are referring to the Qualitative, MV and TA samples. 
Next, we provide the industry distribution of the constituents of each sample in Table 3 below.
 
6 Totals assets as reported by the financial accounts of the firms. Some firms report total assets quarterly 




Table 3 – The number of stocks in each sample categorised into industry groups. The AS sample are all publicly listed firms in the NYSE, NASDAQ and IEX, the Qualitative sample are stocks in 
the AS sample that have passed only the qualitative screen mentioned previously, the MV sample are the stocks in the Qualitative sample that have passed the quantitative screen that utilises 
market capitalisation (or market value for short) as the denominator, finally, the TA sample are the stocks in the Qualitative sample that have passed the quantitative screen that utilises total 
assets as the denominator. MV-TA shows the difference between the MV and TA sample. (MV/All-Stocks) % and (TA/All-Stocks) % show the proportion in percentage of the MV and TA sample 
within the All-Stocks sample.  
Industry Group All-Stocks Qualitative MV TA MV-TA (MV/All-Stocks) % (TA/All-Stocks) % 
Industrials 
Aerospace & Defence 48 48 27 32 -5 56.3 66.7 
Construction & Engineering 36 35 8 16 -8 22.2 44.4 
Freight & Logistics Services 78 78 32 30 2 41 38.5 
Professional & Commercial Services 183 183 81 78 3 44.3 42.6 
Passenger Transportation Services 26 26 7 12 -5 26.9 46.2 
Transport Infrastructure 4 4 3 1 2 75 25 
Industrial Conglomerates 12 12 5 7 -2 41.7 58.3 
Diversified Industrial Goods Wholesaler 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Machinery, Equipment & Components 191 191 128 133 -5 67 69.6 
Consumer Cyclical 
Automobiles & Auto Parts 58 58 22 35 -13 37.9 60.3 
Textiles & Apparel 44 44 27 27 0 61.4 61.4 
Homebuilding & Construction Supplies 60 60 22 27 -5 36.7 45 
Household Goods 27 27 14 13 1 51.9 48.1 
Specialty Retailers 107 107 60 63 -3 56.1 58.9 
Hotels & Entertainment Services 122 77 25 28 -3 20.5 23 
Leisure Products 30 30 18 18 0 60 60 
Media & Publishing 115 35 10 13 -3 8.7 11.3 
Diversified Retail 27 26 10 9 1 37 33.3 
Consumer Non-Cyclical 
Beverages 34 20 7 8 -1 20.6 23.5 




Personal &Household Products & Services 46 46 26 22 4 56.5 47.8 
Food & Drug Retailing 34 34 12 16 -4 35.3 47.1 
Financials 
Banking Services 577 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Investment Banking & Investment Services 148 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Holding Companies 66 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Insurance 135 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Real Estate Operations 49 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Residential & Commercial REIT 262 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Collective Investments 1,457 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Healthcare 
Healthcare Equipment & Supplies 214 214 110 88 22 51.4 41.1 
Healthcare Providers & Services 74 74 28 22 6 37.8 29.7 
Pharmaceuticals 156 156 50 38 12 32.1 24.4 
Biotechnology & Medical Research 496 496 114 62 52 23 12.5 
Technology 
Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment 111 111 66 74 -8 59.5 66.7 
Communications & Networking 66 66 35 38 -3 53 57.6 
Office Equipment 7 7 3 5 -2 42.9 71.4 
Electronic Equipment & Parts 44 44 26 23 3 59.1 52.3 
Computers, Phones & Household Electronics 44 44 18 22 -4 40.9 50 
Software & IT Services 376 376 156 131 25 41.5 34.8 
Telecommunications Services 
Telecommunications Services 76 76 24 27 -3 31.6 35.5 
Utilities 
Electrical Utilities & IPPs 91 91 3 29 -26 3.3 31.9 
Natural Gas Utilities 15 15 4 10 -6 26.7 66.7 




Multiline Utilities 16 16 2 5 -3 12.5 31.3 
Basic Materials 
Chemicals 84 84 47 42 5 56 50 
Metals & Mining 127 127 50 82 -32 39.4 64.6 
Construction Materials 18 18 5 7 -2 27.8 38.9 
Paper & Forest Products 18 18 9 13 -4 50 72.2 
Containers & Packaging 24 24 7 10 -3 29.2 41.7 
Coal 12 12 2 4 -2 16.7 33.3 
Oil & Gas 189 189 76 95 -19 40.2 50.3 
Oil & Gas Related Equipment and Services 157 157 44 63 -19 28 40.1 
Renewable Energy 32 32 11 23 -12 34.4 71.9 
Uranium 7 7 4 5 -1 57.1 71.4 
Non-applicable 
NA 335 0 0 0 0 0 0 
        






The first glaring observation we can make is the fact that all stocks in the Banking Services, Collective 
Investments, Holding Companies, Insurance, Investment banking & Investment Services, Real Estate 
Operations and Residential & Commercial REITs industry are completely excluded from the SC 
samples (which are the Qualitative, MV and TA samples). This can be explained by the fact that these 
industry groups belong to the Financial industry which are automatically screened out by the 
qualitative screen in the Shariah stock methodology7. The exclusion of financial firms may have a 
negative impact on portfolio diversification benefits as discussed by Kamil et al (2012). El-Gamal 
(2006) also suggested that the lack of access to REITs could lead to a lack of low-beta stocks in the 
universe of SC firms. 
Next, we observe that there are significant differences between the TA and MV samples, despite 
initially having similar number of constituents (1491 stocks for MV vs 1566 stocks for TA), as 
demonstrated by the MV-TA column in Table 3. We see that the MV sample heavily favour stocks in 
the Biotechnology & Medical Research, Healthcare Equipment and Supplies, Healthcare Providers & 
Services, Pharmaceuticals, Software & IT Services industries. The firms in these industries could be 
said to have more intangible assets in their balance sheet. 
The TA sample on the other hand favours Electrical Utilities & IPPs (Independent Power Producers), 
Metals & Mining, Natural Gas Utilities, Oil & Gas, Oil & Gas Related Equipment and Services, 
Renewable Energy, Semiconductors & Semiconductors Equipment and Services and Uranium 
Industries. The firms in these industries could be said to have significant levels of physical assets in 
their balance sheet. Both of these findings on the heterogeneity of constituents of the MV and TA 
samples are consistent with the findings of Mazban & Asutay (2012). 
Next, we refer to the (MV/All-Stocks) % and (TA/All-Stocks) % columns in Table 3. These columns 
describe the portion of the All-stocks samples that the MV and TA samples allows access for 
investments in each industry. For example, the MV sample allows access up to a maximum of 56.3% 
of the total stocks for the Aerospace & Defence industry but only allows access up to a maximum of 
20.6% of the total stocks in the Beverages industry.  
We can observe that the MV and TA samples allows for very different levels of access to different 
industries. We find that the TA sample allow for deeper access to nearly every industry compared to 
the MV sample. Subsequently, this may lead to Muslim investors who have an Industry-oriented 
investment strategy to subscribe the TA sample more than the MV sample. Doing so allows them 
access to almost all industries. 
 
4. Theoretical findings and Empirical Evidence 
 
In this section, we shall investigate deeper than industry constituents and discuss the theoretical 
framework to address the issue of persistent corporate financial behaviour within samples of SC 
firms. We begin with the classic asset valuation theories of Modigliani & Miller (1958, 1961 & 1963), 
hereafter abbreviated as MM. According to proposition 1 of MM (1958), in a perfect world with 
 
7 Technically, not all financial firms are automatically screened out. The S&PDJI Islamic indices Shariah stock 
screening guidelines states that a financial firm is considered to be an Islamic financial institution, and 
therefore are not screened out by the qualitative screening, if they satisfy two conditions. Firstly, all products 
offered by the firm must be Shariah compliant, secondly, there must exists a Shariah Supervisory Board within 
the firm. In any case, the S&PDJI Islamic indices applies this rule only in the GCC and Malaysian markets, not in 




perfect capital markets, the value of the firm is completely independent of its capital structure as a 
direct result of investor’s arbitrage activities even when taxes are included (together with interest 
tax shield benefits). Hence, 
 𝑉 ≡ (𝑆 + 𝐷) = ?̅?𝜏𝜌𝑘𝜏  (1) 
 
 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒, ?̅?𝜏  = (1 − 𝜏)(?̅? − rD) +  𝑟𝐷 
 
 
Where V is the total value of the firm, S is the market value of the firm’s equity (it’s common shares), 
D is the market value of the debt of the firm, 𝜏 is the corporate tax rate, ?̅? is the expected earnings 
of the firm’s asset8,  𝑟 is the returns/costs of a certain stream (debt)9 and finally, 𝜌𝑘𝜏  is the market 
capitalisation rate for the expected uncertain streams of after-tax earnings of firms in the kth class10. 
Equation 1 essentially suggest that no matter how the firm manipulates its capital structure (thereby 
its ownership), its fundamental value will remain the same. For if the firm’s management raise debt 
(D) in order to increase the firm’s value (whilst earnings remain unchanged), then investors would 
have the incentive to undertake arbitrage activities11 which should reduce the firm’s equity value (S), 
thus bringing the firm’s total value, S+D, back to the original level. 
However, later in MM (1963) the authors published a correction where they showed that even in a 
perfect world with perfect capital markets, if taxes exist (together with interest tax shield benefits), 
then the value of the firm rises with higher tax rate and higher leverage as shown in Equation 2 
below for the value of the levered firm, 𝑉𝐿 (where R is the interest expense of the firm). 
 
 𝑉𝐿 = ?̅?(1 − 𝜏)𝜌𝑘𝜏 + 𝜏𝑅𝑟  (2) 
 
Since, 𝑟 = 𝑅𝐷 
Then it must be that, 𝐷 = 𝑅𝑟  
Thus, Equation (2) can be rewritten as, 
 
8 This can be understood as the EBIT. 
9 Assume that all parties are able to borrow and invest in safe bonds at the same rate, 𝑟, irrespective of the 
amount borrowed. 
10 Assume that firms can be grouped into different “risk-classes” whereby within each class, the ratio of the 
expected earnings to the market capitalisation rate is equal or differ only by scale. 
11 The calculations of the arbitrage activities are lengthy and have already been proven in MM (1961 & 1963), 




 𝑉𝐿 = ?̅?(1 − 𝜏)𝜌𝑘𝜏 + 𝜏𝐷 (3) 
 
Therefore, the value of the firm according to MM (1963) is the sum of its after-tax earnings 
capitalised at the market capitalisation rate for uncertain streams at the Kth-class, plus the certain 
stream of income, 𝜏𝐷, that is capitalised at the rate of 𝑟. From Equation (3), MM (1963) proceeds to 
find the cut-off rate for investments which is commonly utilised in capital budgeting in the sense of 
how much additional earnings a new investment must contribute to the current level of earnings in 
order to justify the additional capital it requires.  
The cut-off rate can be found by taking the first derivative of Equation (3) with respect to a marginal 
change in investment. First, we denote 𝑉𝐿 to just V, and we rewrite Equation (3) into, 𝑉 = (1 − 𝜏)𝜌𝑘𝜏 ?̅? + 𝜏𝐷 
Then, MM (1963) introduce its first derivative with respect to a marginal change in investment, 
denoted as 𝐼, 
 𝑑𝑉𝑑𝐼 = (1 − 𝜏)𝜌𝑘𝜏 𝑑?̅?𝑑𝐼 + 𝜏 𝑑𝐷𝑑𝐼  (4) 
 
For any investment to be worthwhile from the perspective of shareholders, the ratio of the marginal 
change of value of the firm to the marginal change of investment must be a minimum of 1 but 
preferably more, in other words, 
𝑑𝑉𝑑𝐼 ≥ 1. Equation 4 suggest that 𝑑𝑉𝑑𝐼 ≥ 1 can only be achieved if, 
 𝑑?̅?𝑑𝐼 ≥ 1 − 𝜏 𝑑𝐷𝑑𝐼1 − 𝜏 𝜌𝑘𝜏 (5) 
 
Keen observers will see that the RHS of Equation (5) is the multiplicative inverse of the RHS of 
Equation (4) that instantly equates 
𝑑𝑉𝑑𝐼  to 1. Equation (5) tells us that the cut-off rate cannot be found 
without a reference to the capital structure policy (measured by 
𝑑𝐷𝑑𝐼 ) of the firm first, that is, the 
marginal change in debt given the marginal change in investment. From Equation (5) it is clear that 
investments financed entirely by equity financing (thus 
𝑑𝐷𝑑𝐼 = 0) will have a cut-off rate of 𝜌𝑘𝜏1−𝜏. On the 
other hand, investments entirely financed by debt financing (thus 
𝑑𝐷𝑑𝐼 = 1) will have a cut-off rate of 𝜌𝑘𝜏 . These cut-off rates are in fact polar extremes in a spectrum of cut-off rates demonstrated in 
Diagram 5 below. MM (1963) notes how most firms finance their investments with a combination of 
both debt and equity and therefore lie somewhere along the spectrum in Diagram 5 below in 
between the polar opposites. Furthermore, they caution against deciding the cut-off rate every 
single time the firm decides upon an investment opportunity. This is because firms do not usually 
take up financing every time they venture into new investments. In fact, the capital structure policy 
of the firm is usually decided ex ante, which then the firm allocates capital to the most promising 
investments. Therefore, MM (1963) suggest that since the firm’s capital structure should hover 
around it’s “target debt ratio” denoted as L, the firm should therefore substitute L into 𝑑𝐷𝑑𝐼  in 





Diagram 5 – The spectrum of cut-off rates for the conventional firms. 
It is clear from Diagram 5 above that the conventional firm have access to the full spectrum of cut-
off rates depending on their capital structure policy (in practice, this can be measured by their debt 
ratio)12. Therefore, conventional firms in the US may have their cut-off rates vary from 
𝜌𝑘𝜏1−𝜏 all the 
way to 𝜌𝑘𝜏  depending on their target debt ratio.   
 
4.1 The cut-off rates of investments for SC firms 
 
However, we know from the contemporary Shariah Stock Screening Methodology that firms in the 
US may hold only up to 33% of their capital structure as debt if they are to remain SC (since they do 
not have access to a robust Islamic debt market). Therefore, SC firms in the US’s access to the 
spectrum in Diagram 5 above is limited to only 33% debt (and therefore 67% equity) as illustrated in 
Diagram 6 below. 
 
 
Diagram 6 – The spectrum of cut-off rates for SC firms. 
 
Diagram 6 above entails that SC firms in the US face a much more limited spectrum of cut-off rates 
that ranges only from 
𝜌𝑘𝜏1−𝜏 to 1−0.33𝜏1−𝜏 𝜌𝑘𝜏  . This more limited spectrum reflects the fact that SC firms in 
the US are more restricted in their capital structure policy vis-à-vis their conventional counterpart. 
It must be noted here that it is not the case that some firms in the US plan their capital structure 
policy so that they retain or obtain the Shariah compliancy status, for they may or may not be 
concerned of their Shariah compliancy in the first place (which is the subject of future research 
papers). For this current paper however, we assume that US firms are not concerned of their Shariah 
compliancy, instead, Shariah compliancy is a matter of importance only for investors seeking to 
invests in the universe of SC firms in the US. 
 
12 The Debt ratio here is defined as the ratio of tax-deductible debt to the total value of the firm, the latter can 
be measured by total assets or total market capitalisation. Although there are firms who have 100% equity 
financing in their capital structure, realistically, 100% debt financing is not feasible for firms due to very high 
bankruptcy costs and risks. In the real world, some firms may hold up to 90% debt financing as in the case of 




Therefore, when we say that SC firms face a more limited spectrum of cut-off rates, we mean that 
whenever a firm is classified as Shariah compliant (for the universe of SC firms in the US is dynamic 
and changes every quarter), then it must be the case that their cut-off rate is somewhere in between 𝜌𝑘𝜏1−𝜏 to 1−0.33𝜏1−𝜏 𝜌𝑘𝜏  only.  
Suppose now we investigate the average cut-off rate for conventional firms, 
 
 ( 𝜌𝑘𝜏1−𝜏 + 𝜌𝑘𝜏)2 = (𝜌𝑘𝜏+(1−𝜏)𝜌𝑘𝜏1−𝜏 )2 = (𝜌𝑘𝜏 + (1 − 𝜏)𝜌𝑘𝜏2(1 − 𝜏) ) = (𝜌𝑘𝜏 + (𝜌𝑘𝜏 − 𝜌𝑘𝜏𝜏)2(1 − 𝜏) ) = (2𝜌𝑘𝜏 − 𝜏𝜌𝑘𝜏2(1 − 𝜏) ) (6) 
 
On the other hand, the average cut-off rate for SC firms is, 
 ( 𝜌𝑘𝜏1−𝜏 + 1−0.33𝜏1−𝜏 𝜌𝑘𝜏  )2 = (𝜌𝑘𝜏+𝜌𝑘𝜏−0.33𝜏𝜌𝑘𝜏1−𝜏 )2 = (2𝜌𝑘𝜏 − 0.33𝜏𝜌𝑘𝜏2(1 − 𝜏) ) (7) 
 
Comparing Equation (6) with Equation (7), we find that the average cut-off rate for SC firms should 
be larger than the average cut-off rate for conventional firms because the nominator in the last term 
of Equation (7) is reduced only by 0.33 𝜏𝜌𝑘𝜏  compared to its counterpart in Equation (6) where the 
nominator is reduced by the full 𝜏𝜌𝑘𝜏  amount. To the best of our knowledge, this finding is new and 
has not been discussed in the contemporary Islamic finance literature before. 
 
4.2 Profitability  
 
Having larger long-run average cut-off rates may directly impact the corporate financial behaviour of 
firms in the universe of SC firms. A straightforward example of this would be how Equation (5) 
predicted that our MV and TA samples should have a higher marginal profitability growth, with 
respect to marginal investment, compared to their conventional counterparts simply because the 
definition of ?̅? is equal to the contemporary definition of the firm’s profitability. Diagram 7 and 
Table 4 below illustrate empirical evidence in support of Equation (5). 
Table 4 – OLS regressions describing the relationship between investments and profitability in the AS 
sample vis-à-vis the MV and TA samples. The MV and TA samples exhibit higher marginal change in 
profitability in response to a given marginal change in investments. 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1 
 AS sample MV sample TA sample 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 
Constant .1530285 .1188368 .1069684 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡−1 -.021484 .3719596*** .5893061*** 
    
No. of Observations 20 20 20 
R-squared 0.0123 0.1868 0.4709 






Diagram 7 demonstrate a scatter plot of profitability and 1-year lagged investments13 for the AS, MV 
and TA samples from the year 2001 to 2019. Direct observations show that higher investments last 
year bring about higher profitability this year for all samples. Next, we fit an OLS line-of-best fit for 
each sample and present the regression results in Table 4 to better observe this relationship. Table 4 
show that the AS sample’s slope coefficient for investments is statistically non-significant (meaning 
that it is not significantly different from 0) whilst the MV and TA samples both have a slope of 
approximately 0.372 and 0.589 respectively14. This implies that a marginal increase in investments 
should bring about larger marginal increase in profitability for the MV and TA samples compared to 
the AS sample. To better illustrate this, Diagram 7 show how a given change in investments, say X%, 
leads to a considerably larger change in profitability, say Y%, in each sample, with 𝑌%𝑇𝐴 > 𝑌%𝑀𝑉> 𝑌%𝐴𝑆. 
 
4.3 Size and Size Growth 
 
Other variables are not so straightforward. To see how higher size growth may be a natural 
consequence of the higher average long run cut-off rate, consider that the dividend discount model 
suggests that the market value per share of a firm is, 
 𝑚𝑡 = ∑ 𝐸(𝑑𝑡+𝜏)(1 + 𝑟)𝜏∞𝜏=1  (8) 
 
Where, 𝑚𝑡 is the price per share at time t, 𝐸(𝑑𝑡+𝜏) is the expected dividends at time t+ 𝜏 and finally,  𝑟  is the long term average expected stock returns. MM (1961) show, via implication, that Equation 
(8) is equal to, 
 
 
13 Assuming that investments last year have an impact on profitability of this year. 
14 The non-significance of investment in the AS sample is caused by the outlier in the year 2001, which itself is 
due to the Dotcom Bubble burst. For demonstration purposes only, we approximated an OLS line of best fit for 
the AS sample by removing the single outlier in the AS sample. Caution must be exercised though; true outliers 




 𝑀𝑡 = ∑ 𝐸(𝑌𝑡+𝜏 − 𝑑𝐵𝑡+𝜏)(1 + 𝑟)𝜏∞𝜏=1  (9) 
 
Where 𝑀𝑡 is the total market capitalisation of the firm at time t, 𝑌𝑡+𝜏 is the total earnings of the firm 
at time t+ 𝜏 and finally, 𝑑𝐵𝑡+𝜏 is the change in book equity in 1 period (𝑑𝐵𝑡+𝜏 = 𝐵𝑡+𝜏 − 𝐵𝑡+𝜏−1). 
Suppose we simplify Equation (9) into a static model where, 𝑀 = 𝑌 − 𝑑𝐵(1 + 𝑟) 
Finding the first derivative of this equation with respect to the marginal change in investment, yields 
(assume that 𝑟 is constant), 
 𝑑𝑀𝑑𝐼 = 𝑑𝑌𝑑𝐼 − 𝑑𝑑𝐵𝑑𝐼(1 + 𝑟)  
 
since 𝑑𝐵 is the measurement of investment in MM (1963), then  𝑑𝑑𝐵 must be the marginal change 
in investment, which is equal to 𝑑𝐼. Therefore, 
 𝑑𝑀𝑑𝐼 = 𝑑𝑌𝑑𝐼 − 1(1 + 𝑟) (10) 
 
which tells us that the rate of change of total market capitalisation of the firm with respect to its 
investment depends on the rate of change of earnings with respect to its investments. The latter 
term, 
𝑑𝑌𝑑𝐼 , is exactly the same as the first term in Equation (4), 𝑑?̅?𝑑𝐼 , by definition. In fact, if we added 𝑑𝐷𝑑𝐼  
on both sides of Equation (10) then we actually get back Equation (4)15.  
Therefore, if  
𝑑𝑌𝑑𝐼  is formally equal to 𝑑?̅?𝑑𝐼 , and we have shown that 𝑑?̅?𝑑𝐼  of Shariah compliant firms are on 
average larger than conventional firms (due to the higher average cut-off rate), then, according to 
Equation (10), it must be the case that, on average, for a given marginal change in investments, the 
marginal growth of 𝑀 for firms in SC samples, must necessarily be larger than the growth of 𝑀 for 
conventional firms. Since size growth is usually measured by the rate of change of 𝑀 per period, it is 
thus clear that the marginal size growth of Shariah compliant firms with respect to a given marginal 
investment should therefore be necessarily larger compared to conventional firms. 
To investigate empirically whether a marginal change in investment results in a larger marginal 
change in size for the SC samples, we simplify Equation (10) into, 
  𝑑𝑀𝑑𝐼 = 1(1 + 𝑟) (𝑑𝑌𝑑𝐼 − 1) 𝑑𝑀 = 1(1 + 𝑟) 𝑑𝐼(𝑑𝑌𝑑𝐼 − 1) 
 
15 Since 




𝑑𝑀 = 1(1 + 𝑟) (𝑑𝑌 − 𝑑𝐼) 
 𝑑𝑀 = 1(1 + 𝑟) 𝛾 (11) 
 
Let,  𝛾 = 𝑑𝑌 − 𝑑𝐼 𝛾 in Equation (11) represents the net change in marginal earnings after a given marginal change in 
investments. By holding 𝑟 constant, Equation (11) allows us to investigate the marginal impact of 𝛾 
on 𝑑𝑀, which is the size growth rate of firms. A higher slope coefficient of 𝛾 implies that, a marginal 
change in investments bring about a higher marginal change in size growth, via a higher change in 
marginal earnings.    
Below in Table 5, we present a set of simple OLS regressions explaining the relationship of 𝛾 on size 
growth. 
Table 5 – OLS regressions describing the relationship of 𝛾 on size growth in the AS sample vis-à-vis 
the MV and TA samples. 
 𝑑𝑀𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑡 
 
 AS sample MV sample TA sample 
 𝑑𝑀𝑡 𝑑𝑀𝑡 𝑑𝑀𝑡 
Constant .0026557 .0307743 .03898 𝛾𝑡 -.1849309*** .007926***   -.0110028*** 
    
t 19 19 19 
n 6874 1491 1566 
R-squared 0.4601 0.3794 0.4300 
    
Table 5 above show that our SC samples have significantly higher slope coefficients for 𝛾 compared 
to the AS sample which confirms the prediction of Equation (10). That is, due to the floor limit of the 
investment cut-off rate, a marginal increase in investments leads to, on average, a higher marginal 
increase in earnings. The higher marginal increase in earnings in turn contribute to a higher marginal 
increase in market capitalisation. 
Additionally, we also observe that SC samples tend to have consistently higher average size 





Diagram 8 – Average size of firms in the AS, QL, MV and TA samples. 
It may be the case that a higher marginal change in size, in response to a given marginal change in 
investments, causes our SC samples to have consistently higher average size compared to the AS 
sample. Diagram 8 essentially show that the average size of firms in the Qualitative, MV and TA 
samples are larger than the average size in the AS sample.  Additionally, since the AS sample include 
all stocks, from the smallest to the largest, the average size tends to be pulled down by the large 
number of small stocks in the NASDAQ.  
It can be said that since smaller firms tend to have lesser book assets as well as smaller market 
capitalisation (due to them being penny stocks) their chance of passing the quantitative screening is 
also small. This is because their total assets and total market capitalisation, being the denominator 
of the financial ratios, are smaller. This explains why there exists a steep drop off in average size 
between the Qualitative sample and both the MV and TA sample; the quantitative screening in the 
Shariah stock screening procedure screens out penny stocks. Therefore, we can conclude that the 
universe of SC firms tends to exclude penny stocks, resulting in a higher-than-usual average size.  
 
4.4 Book-to-Market (B/M) Ratio 
 
Based on Diagram 8, Equation (10) and regression results in Table 5 previously, one may predict that 
the average B/M ratio for our SC samples, especially the MV and TA samples, would have been 
consistently low since the B/M ratio is defined as,   





and we have shown that 𝑀 marginally increases at a higher rate for Shariah compliant firms 
compared to conventional firms in response to a given marginal investment, thus, it should be that 
the denominator in the above equation increases faster for the MV and TA samples compared to the 
AS sample, thus leading to consistently lower B/M ratio for the MV and TA samples. 
However, plotting the median16  B/M ratio reveals an important pattern; only the MV sample show 
consistently lower B/M ratio versus the AS sample. The Qualitative sample show major and 
consistent difference only after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, prior to that it’s median B/M ratio 
follows closely with the AS sample’s. The TA sample, however, consistently show a median B/M ratio 
that is only marginally different from the AS sample’s (it even exceeds it in Q4 2008) throughout the 
entire period of study.  
 
Diagram 9 – B/M ratios of the AS, QL, MV & TA samples. 
The consistently higher B/M ratio for the TA sample entails the following; even with consistent and 
significantly higher market capitalisation previously shown in Diagram 8, the TA sample still show 
consistently higher B/M ratio which implies that firms in the TA sample must have consistently high 
total book equity. This further suggest that relative to the MV sample, the TA sample consists of 
firms with significantly higher tangible assets (since it is more likely that tangible assets are captured 
in the balance sheet and thus contribute to higher book equity). On the other hand, firms in the MV 
sample could have more intangible assets as most of their value are captured in their market 
capitalisation (i.e their stock’s price) but not on their balance sheet, which leads to consistently low 
book equity and thus consistently low B/M ratio. 
 
 
16 The data suggests that B/M ratios for all samples, except the MV samples, are not normally distributed. 
Additionally, some samples, such as the AS sample show very high skewness (more than 100, indicating 
significant number of outliers), which makes using average B/M ratio impractical and hard-to-read. To 
preserve clarity and conciseness, we opt to use median B/M ratio which improves readability for all samples, 






In this section, we will discuss the implications of a higher long-run average cut-off rate on the firm’s 
investment expenditure. We will show in the following analysis that firms in the SC sample is 
expected to have lesser cumulative sum of return on investments vis-à-vis the AS sample.  
First, assume two identical firms in the same risk class, K, with identical set of investment projects. 
One firm is adamant in keeping their Shariah compliancy, whilst the other one is uninterested in 
their Shariah compliancy. This means that the former will have their 
𝑑𝐷𝑑𝐼  restricted up to 0.33, thus 
having a minimum cut-off rate of 
1−0.33𝜏1−𝜏 𝜌𝑘𝜏 . The conventional firm can reduce their cut-off rate close 
to 𝜌𝑘𝜏  by undertaking more and more tax-deductible debt, so that their 𝑑𝐷𝑑𝐼  approaches 1. 
Next, assume that the identical set of investment projects of these two firms can be stacked in a 
hierarchy as shown in the Diagram 10 below with the most lucrative projects on the top (which 
yields 
𝜌𝑘𝜏1−𝜏 percent return on investments) and the most unprofitable at the bottom (which yields 
only 𝜌𝑘𝜏  percent return on investments). Notice also that we assume that these projects have a 
common difference of 0.01 percent in profitability between each other. 
 
Diagram 10 – Hierarchy of investment projects with the most profitable projects on the top, and the 
least profitable projects on the bottom 
The investment projects in Diagram 10 above can be thought of as an arithmetic progression with 
the two firms taking the most lucrative projects first and work their way down until the return on 
investment that the marginal project yield is exactly equal to their cut-off rate (assume that they 
both have enough, or have the ability to raise enough capital, in order to undertake these projects).  
This imply that the Shariah compliant firm with the maximum amount of tax-deductible debt 
allowed (thus, the minimum cut-off rate) will undertake projects that yield up until the rate of 1−0.33𝜏1−𝜏 𝜌𝑘𝜏 , whilst the conventional firm should be able to undertake projects up until the yield is 
close to the rate of  𝜌𝑘𝜏 . Calculating each firm’s cumulative return on investment (CROI) yields, 





 𝐶𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 = 1022 × 2 ( 𝜌1 − 𝜏) + (102 − 1) (0.01𝜏𝜌1 − 𝜏 )= 51 × (2𝜌 + 1.01𝜏𝜌1 − 𝜏 ) = (102 + 51.51𝜏1 − 𝜏 ) 𝜌 (12) 
 
For the Shariah compliant firm on the other hand, 
 
 𝐶𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑡 = 342 × 2 ( 𝜌1 − 𝜏) + (34 − 1) (0.01𝜏𝜌1 − 𝜏 )= 17 × (2𝜌 + 0.33𝜏𝜌1 − 𝜏 ) = (34 + 5.61𝜏1 − 𝜏 ) 𝜌 (13) 
 
Comparing the last term for equations (12) and (13), for equal values of 𝜏 and 𝜌, the cumulative 
return on investment of Shariah compliant firms should consistently be smaller than the CROI of 
conventional firms17.  Smaller CROI should bring about lesser investments if firms base their 
investment decisions solely on their investment cut-off rate and the profitability of projects. Thus, 
Equation (12) and (13) predicts that a stylised fact of our samples’ investments rate should show a 
consistently lower investment rate for our SC samples compared to the AS sample. We investigate 




17 Setting 𝜏 = 0.3, 𝜌 = 1.4, yields, 𝐶𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 = (102 + 51.51(0.3)1 − 0.3 ) 1.4 = 167.79% 𝐶𝑅𝑂𝐼𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑡 = (34 + 5.61(0.3)1 − 0.3 ) 1.4 = 50.98% 
Thus, comparing (167.79% 50.98%) ∗ 100 = 30.38%⁄ . In other words, even with the minimum cut-off rate 
available, Shariah compliant firms are expected to make only 30.38% the amount of return on investments 




Diagram 1118 - Normalised average investment rate of the AS, QL, MV and TA samples. 
Diagram 11 shows the normalised19 average investment rate of the AS sample vis-à-vis our SC 
samples. The diagram suggests that except during a crisis, the SC samples’ investment rate is 
generally lower compared to the AS sample consistent with Equations (12) and (13). That is, during 
“normal” times, there exists evidence to suggest prima facie that the floor limit imposed on the 
investment cut-off rate of SC sample contribute to them having consistently lower investment rates. 
Only during the years surrounding the Dotcom Bubble burst and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis did 
the investment rates of our SC samples are higher than the AS samples’, even then, it was more to 
do with the volatility of average investments in the AS sample. The relatively stable investment rate 





The primary implication of our findings in this paper are towards asset pricing models and the 
discovery of “normal” expected returns for SC samples in the US. This subsequently helps in 
determining the appropriate risk-factor base models for event studies that focuses on the discovery 
of consistent abnormal returns. According to Fama & French (2015), 71% to 94% the variation of 
expected returns of a sample of all US publicly listed stocks (akin to our AS sample) is explained by 
the Five-Factor Model consisting of Beta, Size premium, Value premium, Profitability premium and 
finally, Investment premium. (These last four premiums are also known as SMB, HML, RMW and 
CMA respectively). 
Since the last four premiums are calculated by sorting firms into 2x2, 2x3, 2x2x2x2 and among many 
other sorts using firm characteristics, such as total market capitalisation, B/M ratio, profitability and 
investments of NYSE medians (for a 2x2 sort) or percentiles (other sorts), could the biasness that is 
illustrated in this paper affect the Five-factor asset pricing models of our SC samples? Or in simpler 
words, could the Shariah debt screening ratio skew the firm characteristic of our SC samples so much 
that their asset pricing models becomes substantially different vis-à-vis the AS sample?     
Our results in Equation (12) and (13) may offer insights into how the investment premium in Five-
factor model may not be a consistently significant explanator to the expected returns of our SC 
samples. This is because, when Shariah compliant firms are sorted into high and low investment 
groups, the variations of differences in their average returns do not explain the variations of 
expected returns of individual stocks due to all of them having similarly depressed investment 
patterns (due to their limited range of cut-off rates). 
This line of argument can also be applied to the limited significance of the profitability premium as 
well. That is, systematically higher cut-off rates imply that whatever investment projects that Shariah 
compliant firms undertake, the projects must yield systematically higher profits for all groups in our 
 
18 The extreme negative investments for the AS sample in the year 2000 is caused by the Dotcom Bubble burst. 
The AS sample, by definition, consists of all publicly listed stocks in the US, including technology stocks in the 
NASDAQ that were heavily involved in the Dotcom Bubble burst. The extreme negative investment in 2000 was 
due to them writing off most of their book assets. This observation is robust even when outliers are removed. 
19 Investments in all samples show extreme positive skewness. For the sake of illustration, we normalise all 
samples by removing extreme outliers. The data in diagram 11 above represents at least 90% of all 




SC samples. Therefore, since all firms in the SC samples have similar profitability, when they are 
sorted into high or low profitability groups, the variation in expected returns between the groups are 
relatively small and therefore could not explain the variation in expected returns of individual stocks, 
thus making most of slope coefficients for the profitability premium in a Five-factor model 
insignificant. 
Another implication of our findings is relevant towards fundamental analysis. In the long run, if all 
earnings are transformed into payouts20, then the higher marginal change in earnings given a 
marginal change in investments shown in Equation (10) and Table 5 suggests that growth rate of 
dividends, g, used in the Gordon Growth Model may be higher for our SC samples compared to the 
AS sample. This is especially true given how the MV and TA samples show a relatively stable 
investment rate compared to the AS sample. A higher g implies lower discount rates and therefore 
suggests that the intrinsic value of firms in the MV and TA samples could be, on average, higher 
relative to the average intrinsic value of the AS sample. 
 
5.  Summary 
 
In this paper we have shown that, when a sample of nearly all publicly listed stocks in the US are 
screened through both the qualitative and quantitative screening in the contemporary Shariah Stock 
Screening procedure, a set of samples with unique firm level characteristics are found. Although the 
MV and TA samples are roughly of the same size (approximately 1500 to 1600 firms), their industry 
distribution are different, the MV sample skews towards firms with intangible assets such as 
Software & IT Services industries, whilst the TA sample consists more of Oil & Gas, Oil & Gas Related 
Equipment and Services. Additionally, the TA sample offers the widest exposure to all industries if 
coverage is the priority of the investor. 
The average long run cut-off rate of investments for SC firms should be larger compared to the 
average long run cut-off rate for conventional firms, due to the fact that SC firms are unable to hold 
tax-deductible debt more than 33% of their firm value. 
Since 
𝑑?̅?𝑑𝐼  shares the same definition as profitability growth rate, and we have shown that 𝑑?̅?𝑑𝐼  of SC 
firms are, on average, larger than conventional firms, then it must be the case that SC firms have 
higher marginal profitability growth rate given a marginal change in investment compared to 
conventional firms on average, which is precisely what we observe in Diagram 7 and Table 4. 
Next, by utilising a static version of the dividend discount model, we were able to show that the 
marginal size growth rate of SC firms given a marginal change in investment is expected to exceed 
conventional firms, which is supported by our empirical findings in Diagram 8 and Table 5. 
Furthermore, we observe the consistently low B/M ratio for the MV sample but similar B/M ratio for 
the TA and AS sample in Diagram 9. 
Finally, by taking the example of two identical firms that differ only by their Shariah compliancy, we 
were able to demonstrate how the Shariah compliant firm should undertake lower investments 
compared to its conventional counterpart simply due to the fact that it’s minimum investment cut-
off rate are higher vis-à-vis the conventional firm. We provide empirical evidence of this finding in 
Diagram 11. 
 




Our findings primarily affect the asset pricing models of SC samples, which warrants further 
investigations that are carried out in later papers. Additionally, samples of SC firm may exhibit higher 
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